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ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS IN THE ENFORCEMENT
OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES*
RALPH F. FucHs**
T HE PURPOSES of law determine its content and account for the
decisions of courts and administrative agencies; but purpose
is registered typically in rules and principles. Once these have been
enacted or accepted, they are purportedly applied with only second-
ary, rather than primary, reference to the considerations that gave
them birth.' In other words, a doctrinal screen separates the ends
of law from the process of effectuating them through administra-
tion and adjudication. Decisions are reached, or at least rational-
ized, in terms of legal propositions recorded upon the screen, 2
rather than in terms of the purposes that lie behind. It is so in the
traditional fields of private law; in the criminal law; and in large
areas of public law, such as those by which pensions and benefits
are provided. It is emphatically not so, however, under the anti-
trust laws of the United States ;3 for there the doctrinal screen is
exceedingly thin and large of mesh, permitting-indeed requiring-
the enforcement tribunals to look constantly through it to the pur-
poses of the laws, instead of finding their patterns of decision upon
the screen itself. The rules of anti-trust law are few and broad in
terms; the necessity for resorting to social ends and economic data
as guides to decisions is constant.
*This paper has been prepared for presentation to the Third Interna-
tional Congress of Comparative Law at the Hague, August 1-7, 1950. Since
it is intended for the information of foreign lawyers having no previous
acquaintance with the antitrust law of the United States and was subject
to a word limit, it is rather elementary and cryptic. We believe it has sug-
gestive value for readers in this country, however, especially by way of
introduction to the subject.
**Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
1. Cf. Holmes, The Common Law, esp. p. 5 (1881).
2. There is no intention here, of course, of estimating with precision
the relative roles of legal doctrines and practical considerations in judicial
administration. Sufficient to the argument is the point that lawyers and
judges typically frame their questions and put their answers in doctrinal
terms.
3. Under the terminology employed in the United States, antitrust law
is the law designed to guard against monopolies, restrictive business com-
binations, and undesirable restraints of trade. Statutory and non-statutory
doctrines of early English law, which had these purposes, form a back-
ground for 19th-century decisions, and occasional contemporary ones, in the
United States, which do not rest upon modem statutes. In the United States,
however, Federal and state legislation has almost entirely covered the field
and forms the starting point for practically all decisions. Because of the
nation-wide scale of much of American business and the greater vigor of
enforcement by Federal officials as compared with those of the States
(with rare exceptions), the state antitrust laws have become of decidedly
secondary importance. This paper will be confined to the Federal laws.
ANTITRUST LAWS
I. The Evolution of Antitrust Doctrines and Methods of
Enforcement
The principal Federal antitrust law is the Sherman Act of
1890. 4 It prohibits "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations,"5 and any con-
duct whereby any person "shall monopolize, or attempt to monopo-
lize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations. . . ." Criminal prosecutions for
violations and civil enforcement proceedings at the suit of the
Attorney General and of private parties, are authorized.
7
The terms of the Sherman Act's prohibitions are obviously
broad and afford little guidance to the decision of cases arising
under them. Under one interpretation originally urged, these terms
derive more specific meaning from the preexisting common law
and do not extend beyond it ;8 but this view has not been accepted.
Instead, the substantive clauses of the statute have been deemed to
prohibit vague, rather than precise, categories of acts which con-
flict with the legislative purpose.9 That purpose, it can scarcely be
doubted, was the maintenance of competition in the economy, 10 in
so far as conflicting laws of a specific nature were not in effect or
might not be afterward adopted."
Since the terms of the statute were very sweeping, it became
necessary to limit their application to acts and transactions which
threaten the maintenance of competition, as distinguished from
others which limit competition merely to serve some legitimate
business purpose. Many business contracts limit the subsequent
competition of the parties or of others in some way; yet clearly it
4. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1946).
5. 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1946).
6. 15 U. S. C. § 2 (1946).
7. Violations of the Act are made misdemeanors by the sections just
cited. Other remedial provisions, including injunction suits, are prescribed in
sections 4-6, 15 U. S. C. §§ 4-6 (1946) ; in section 7, omitted from the Code,
and in supplementary proscriptions of the Clayton Act of 1914, note 32,
infra. 15 U. S. C. §§ 15,26 (1946).
8. Holmes, J., dissenting, in Northern Securities Co. v. United States,
193 U. S. 197, 400, 403-404 (1904). Compare the same writer's opinion of
the Court in Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 394-396 (1905).
9. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 51-62 (1911).
10. The historical evidence is summarized by Chief Justice Stone in
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 489-493 (1940).
11. Legislation, which it is not necessary to cite, provides for regu-
lated monopolies or restrictive licensing in transportation, communication,
and other public services; legalized combination among employees and
farmers; and government ownership of the post office, numerous electric
power and local public utility projects, and atomic energy development.
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was not intended by the Sherman Act to prevent contracts of part-
nership or sale which, to the extent of the business involved, tie the
parties to each other, eliminating competition between them or ex-
cluding outsiders from competing for the same sales. To furnish a
basis for discriminating between lawful transactions and unlawful
restraints, the Supreme .Court, after much difficulty,' 2 announced
its famous "rule of reason" under the Sherman Act, whereby "the
standard of reason [is] ... the measure [to be] used for the purpose
of determining whether in a given case a particular act had or had
not brought about the wrong against which the statute provided."' 3
This so-called rule was, of course, nothing but a formula to
justify the courts in drawing lines between transactions deemed
legitimate on economic grounds and those thought to be harmful.
Far from affording a guide for the future, the opinion which an-
nounced the rule of reason appeared to merge the several clauses
of the Sherman Act into one broad prohibition and thus to elimi-
nate such definiteness as otherwise might have continued to result
from the different phrases in the Act. 4 Under this approach, the
Court has been compelled to distinguish as best it could between
concerted activity that aided' and similar activity that restrained 8
healthy competition, or between corporate consolidations that elimi-
nated competition without warrant' and those that appeared to be
justified by considerations of efficiency in manufacturing or market-
ing.' Similarly, some patent pools and cross-licensing agreements
are sustained because they avoid conflict among the patentees and
make an entire technology available to all, even though at the same
time they strengthen the parties in competition with outsiders, 9
whereas others are condemned because they establish control over
an industry, sustaining prices and excluding competition.20
12. Controversy within the Supreme Court over the interpretation of
the Serman Act is reflected in the following leading cases: United States
v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U. S. 290 (1897) ; United States v.
Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 505 (1898); and Northern Securities
Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 (1904).
13. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 60, 61-64 (1911).
14. Ibid.
15. Maple Flooring Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 563 (1925).
16. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377
(1921).
17. United States v. Reading Co., 253 U. S. 26 (1920).
18. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417 (1920);
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495 (1948).
19. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U. S. 163 (1931).
20. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20 (1912) ;
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 386, 324 U. S. 570 (1945) ;
United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U. S. 319 (1947) ; United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364 (1947). Compare, as to copy-
right, United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 141-144 (1948).
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The "rule of reason," however, did not long remain the sole
formula to guide the courts in applying the Sherman Act. Since
its announcement, the Supreme Court has concluded in a series
of decisions that some restrictive and monopolistic practices pro-
duce so serious a danger to competition or involve so menacing a
concentration of economic power as to be "unreasonable per se."
Under the principle of stare decisis, these practices thereupon be-
came unlawful without reference to their possible economic justifica-
tion under particular circumstances. Such has now become the
holding with respect to agreements among competitors upon the
prices they will charge or pay, at least if a substantial portion of
the trade in a product is involved;21 agreements to refrain from
particular forms of price competition, resulting in price uni-
formity ;22 schemes to influence prices by market operations;2
agreements between a seller and buyers of his product upon resale
prices to be charged by the latter ;24 pooling of profits or receipts
among competitors ;25 territorial division of markets among com-
petitors ;28 agreements among holders of complementary patents,
providing for licenses to others conditioned upon the licensees'
charging stipulated prices for the patented product ;27 intentional
maintenance of power to control prices or exclude competitors ;28
acquisition of power to control prices or exclude competitors
through intentional expansion of a business enterprise ;29 agree-
ments among competitors, occupying a dominant position in an
industry, not to do business with specified outsiders, either to com-
pel them to adopt business practices favored by the conspirators 0
21. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392 (1927).
22. Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683(1948). Similarly, agreements to restrict production for.the purpose of
influencing prices are necessarily illegal. American Column & Lumber Co.
v. United States, 257 U. S. 377 (1921) ; United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F. 2d 416, 444-445 (2d Cir. 1945).
23. United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525, 540-543 (1913); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150 (1940).
24. United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U. S. 85 (1920);
United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U. S. 241 (1942). See also Boston
Store of Chicago v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U. S. 8 (1918).
25. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 149 (1948).
26. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U. S. 319 (1947) ; United
States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio, 1949).
27. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U. S. 287 (1948).
28. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781 (1946).
29. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945).
30. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U. S. 30(1930) ; United States v. First National Pictures, 282 U. S. 44 (1930).
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or to compel them to refrain from dealings with outsiders whose
competition the conspirators desire to eliminate.
3
1
In addition to these judicially evolved rules under the Sherman
Act, the effort has been made to strengthen the antitrust laws by
legislation supplementing that Act, whereby specific business prac-
tices which are thought to endanger competition are rendered
illegal. Among the measures of economic reform adopted in 1914,
early in the administration of President Woodrow Wilson, were
the Clayton Antitrust Act 32 and the Federal Trade Commission
Act.33 The former is a lengthy statute, the most important provi-
sions of which forbid,specified conduct, provided "the effect may be
to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce." The business practices so proscribed are:
discrimination in the prices charged to different buyers of the same
product and the knowing inducement or receipt of such discrimi-
nation ;14 sale or lease of any article on condition that the buyer or
lessee shall not use or deal in the products of a competitor of the
seller or lessor ;3' and acquisition of the capital stock of a com-
petitor.3 6 Enforcement of these provisions is entrusted to the
Federal Trade Commission,3 7 newly established by the Act bearing
that name 3 but may also be had through judicial proceedings in the
same manner as under the Sherman Act, except that criminal
proceedings are in some instances not available. 39 In addition, the
Federal Trade Commission is empowered to proceed against an
undefined group of practices originally designated as "unfair
31. Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Commission, 312
U. S. 457 (1941). Although this case, like the Cement Institute case, arises
technically under the Federal Trade Commission Act, note 33, infra, both
decisions are equally applicable to the Sherman Act.
32. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 12 et seq. (1946).
33. 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 41 et seq. (1946).
The social philosophy embodied in the two foregoing statutes is interest-
ingly presented in Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom, a collection of
addresses made during the 1912 presidential campaign.
34. Clayton Act § 2, as amended June 19, 1936, c. 592 (the Robinson-
Patman Act), 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1946).
35. Id., § 3, 15 U. S. C. § 14 (1946). This provision has been broadened
by interpretation to cover exclusive dealing arrangements which, although
affirmative instead of negative in terms, have the effect of precluding the
purchase or lease of others' products. The decisions on this point are re-
viewed in Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U. S. 293
(1949).
36. Id., § 7, 15 U. S. C. § 18 (1946). This provision has the weakness
of not forbidding acquisition of the assets of a competitor to the same extent
as acquisition of capital stock. Continued attempts to secure strengthening
amendments have so far been unsuccessful.
37. Id., § 11, 15 U. S. C. § 21 (1946).
38. Note 33 supra.
39. Clayton Act §§ 15, 16, 15 U. S. C. §§ 25, 26. Cf. Id., § 9, 15
U. S. C. § 24 (1946) ; Robinson-Patman Act § 3, 15 U. S. C. § 13a (1946).
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methods of competition"40 and now enlarged to include also "unfair
or deceptive acts or practices."4 1 The Commission proceeds by ad-
ministrative order, preceded by hearings, in exercising all of its
powers. Its orders are judicially enforceable, subject to review as
to legality by the courts.
42
It was intended that the 1914 legislation should accomplish two
improvements, among others, in antitrust enforcement. These
were: (1) outlawry of specific conduct dangerous to competition
or productive of monopoly,4 3 and (2) continuous surveillance of
competitive practices by an administrative agency which should be
able to identify additional conduct presenting the same dangers and
to proceed promptly and expeditiously in all such situations."4
For a variety of reasons45 the hopes entertained with respect to
the contribution of the Federal Trade Commission to these aspects
of antitrust enforcement have remained to a large extent unreal-
ized.46 Commission proceedings have been frequently protracted,
rather than expeditious.4 7 The Supreme Court early claimed for
40. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 45
(1946).
41. Act of March 21, 1938, c. 49, 52 Stat. 111 (Wheeler-Lea Act).
The amendment was designed in part to permit the Commission to deal
with practices harmful to consumers, without the necessity of showing that
harm to competitors could also be expected to result. See Federal Trade
Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U. S. 643 (1931); Federal Trade Commis-
sion v. Raladam Co., 316 U. S. 149 (1942).
42. Clayton Act § 11; Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended
by the Wheeler-Lea Act. 15 U. S. C. § 45 (1946).
43. See Sen. Rep. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d sess. 1 (1914); 51 Cong.
Rec. 13,484 (1914).
44. See Sen. Rep. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d sess. 8, 15 (1914); H. R.
No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d sess. 18 (1914) ; 51 Cong. Rec. 11,455 (1914). In
addition, more effective dissolution decrees under the Sherman Act, which
the Commission was to aid in formulating, and a body of Commission-
developed antitrust law which should serve as a more satisfactory guide to
businessmen than was then available, were sought by means of the new
legislation.
45. Among other factors, the quality of appointments to the Commission
has been far from uniformly adequate to the task to be accomplished. See
Herring, The Federal Trade Commissioners, 8 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 339
(1940). Despite criticism from an early date (see Gerard C. Henderson, The
Federal Trade Commission (1924)), moreover, the Commission has ad-
hered to certain methods of administration which have reduced its effective-
ness. Cf. Final Report, Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure, Sen. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st sess. 135-137 (1941). The Com-
mission's annual reports for subsequent years reflect later changes in its
organization and procedure.
46. The Commission has, however, made a major contribution to the
understanding and regulation of business enterprise by a noteworthy series
of investigations and reports. It has also devoted much effort to the elimina-
tion of false and nisleading advertising, a problem which is collateral to
the one here under discussion.
47. An extreme example is the proceedings which eventuated in the
decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, supra, note 22.
These continued in the Commission for six years. 37 F. T. C. 87. Judicial
review of the Commission's order required almost five years. See Aetna
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the judiciary the ultimate determination of what methods of com-
petition are "unfair" within the meaning of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act.48 And the Commission itself has been unable to reduce
its conclusions to the form of a workable code which can be given
effective application.4 9 The definiteness of the rules embodied in the
Clayton Act is, moreover, somewhat illusory because of the qualifi-
cation that the proscribed practices, to be illegal, must present a
threat of substantial lessening of competition or tendency toward
monopoly. The meaning of this provision clearly depends upon
economic factors which have not on the whole been reduced to
rules and hence require exploration in particular situations.
The apparent definiteness of some of the judicially-evolved rules
of "per se illegality" under the Sherman Act also disappears upon
closer examination. Price fixing agreements, for example, al-
though condemned, are not necessarily illegal if less than a "sub-
stantial portion" of an industry participates in them.50 The "rule"
against them, moreover, is subject to the possible exception that
arrangements designed to enable the membdrs of an industry to
mitigate the effects of unrestrained competition, amounting to near-
disaster, are lawful.51 The judgment as to the presence of saving
circumstances in particular cases turns necessarily upon the
economic factors involved. Similarly, the power to control prices
or exclude competitors, which is illegal if purposefully acquired
or maintained, is a matter of economic fact not easy of ascertain-
ment. The masterful analysis in the leading opinion upon the sub-
Portland Cement Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 157 F. 2d 533, 537(7th Cir. 1946), for an account of the proceedings in the initial reviewing
court. Cf. also Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure,
op. cit. mipra note 45, at 367-374.
48. See Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U. S.
568, 579-580 (1923). Partly responsible for this development is a lack of
clarity in the legislative purpose, evidenced in the discussions in Congress.
Thus it was said, in aniwer to objections to the breadth of discretion ap-
parently conferred'upon thfe Commission by the bill then pending, which was
later enacted, that "The term 'unfair competition' has a more or less fixed
meaning in law. It is a term that is known to the law, and has been defined
in part by the courts." 51 Cong. Rec. 11,107 (1914). The words "unfair com-
petition" appeared in the bill under discussion, but were eliminated from the
Act as finally adopted.
49. See Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 Iowa L. Rev. 175 (1936),
for a critical discussion of the Commission's performance in this regard.
50. Cf. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 212
(1939).
51. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344 (1933).
The reasoning of this case is repudiated in the opinion in United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 214-222 (1939); but the decision
is distinguished, not overruled, id. at 216. Hence it remains as a precedent
that may be invoked in future periods of adversity. Other circumstances that
may justify limited nrice fixing appear in Chicago Board of Trade v. United
States, 246 U. S. 231 (1918).
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ject is somewhat weakened by the unrealistic dictum, not necessary
to the decision of the case, that ninety per cent of an industry "is
enough to constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or
sixty-four per cent would be enough; and certainly thirty-three per
cent is not."52 The validity of concentrations of economic power in
the hands of corporate entities therefore remains subject to grave
doubts. These doubts may be resolved as to particular cases by
judicial decisions relating to them; but little guidance for other
situations results from such decisions. 58
Judicial distaste for voyaging upon a "sea of doubt" 54 in eco-
nomic matters, or for engaging in lengthy trials with regard to eco-
nomic problems, 5 is partially responsible for some of the decisions
that have laid down "rules" of antitrust law in the past; for each
formula to guide decisions, to the extent that it is definite, fore-
closes troublesome controversy thereafter. Lately a number of de-
velopments have evidenced a strengthened judicial resolve to ac-
cept legislative prescriptions56 and administrative judgments57
52. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 424(2d Cir., 1945). The Supreme Court's inability to arrive at criteria of
illegality, including the requisite percentage control of the industry in-
volved, in a long series of cases dealing with industrial mergers, is demon-
strated in Handler, Industrial Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws, 32 Col.
L. Rev. 179 (1932), and the same author's Study of the Construction and
Enforcement of the Federal Anti-Trust Laws, T. N. E. C. Monograph No.
38 (1940).
53. The decision in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S.
862 (1948), by a 5-4 vote of the Justices of the Supreme Court, is illustra-
tive. Clear analysis of the facts is employed in the opinion, leading to the
Court's conclusion that illegal control of segments of the steel industry
was not shown to be likely to result from the acquisition of a locally im-
portant fabricating concern by the United States Steel Corporation; but the
conclusion is not demonstrably either correct or incorrect. The case, more-
over, repudiates the suggestion in a case decided only the year before,
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U. S. 218 (1947), that -acquisition of
"some appreciable part" of the market for a concern's product, by purchase
of the businesses of possible customers, is in itself illegal. Hence both so-
called "vertical" integration of businesses and so-called "horizontal" acquisi-
tions remain subject, in effect and for the time being, to the "rule of reason."
54. See the opinion of Judge (later Chief Justice) Taft in United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 283, 284 (6th Cir. 1898).
55. See Dession, The Trial of Economic and Technological Issues of
Fact, 58 Yale L. J. 1019, 1242 (1949), for a discussion of the legal and judi-
cial techniques involved in such proceedings.
56. Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U. S. 293
(1949). In this case the Court adopted a rule that agreements of a single
seller which may be illegal under section 3 of the Clayton Act provided the
"effect may be to substantially lessen competition," are illegal without more
if they cover a substantial portion of the trade in a given product. Vigorous
dissenting opinions contended that the probable effect upon competition
should be made a subject of judicial determination in the light of all relevant
facts, after a trial directed to that issue.
57. Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37(1948); Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 334 U. S. 839(1948).
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whenever possible. This tendency, however, while it may mitigate
the necessity of weighing economic factors in antitrust cases as they
arise in court, cannot dispense with that necessity altogether. To
the extent that it rests upon deference to administrative determina-
tions, moreover, it simply emphasizes the importance of the role
of the Federal Trade Commission in these matters and enlarges the
need for realistic, statesmanlike administration within that agency.
The Commission, to a greater extent than the courts, must con-
tinue to determine whether particular practices arising before it
actually may tend "to substantially lessen competition or ... create
a monopoly." 8
II. Major Economic Factors Influencing Decisions
Given the doctrinal framework and means of enforcement just
outlined, the tribunals that have carried on the task of administer-
ing the antitrust laws of the United States have been influenced in
their decisions by a number of major considerations of policy.
These are largely economic, but to some extent also social and
political, in nature.
To an undetermined extent, of course, the Sherman Act is
based upon a belief in the desirability of a competitive, profit-
seeking, private-enterprise economy such as is contemplated in the
economic theory dominant at the time the statute was enacted,
accompanied by that minimum of governmental regulation which is
envisaged in laissez faire ideology. 9 The Act itself was looked
upon, doubtless, as essentially a police measure, designed to pre-
serve an economic order within which human welfare might be
achieved through competitive processes. 60 The framers of the Act
had no thought, however, of halting the expansion of corporations.
So far as they were concerned, the subjection of large areas of busi-
58. For an illustration of the difficulty of such determinations see In
the Matter of Standard Oil Co., 43 F. T. C. 56 (1946), aff'd, with modifica-
tions, Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 173 F. 2d 210 (7th
Cir. 1949), cert. granted, 338 U. S. 865 (1949), in which two specific policies
under the antitrust laws appear to come in conflict and the answer to the
problem presented turns largely upon the relevant conceptions of competi-
tion.
59. Hamilton and Till, Antitrust in Action, T. N. E. C.- Monograph
No. 16, 3 (1940). Illuminating excerpts from the legislative history of the
Sherman Act may be found in Milton Handler, Cases and Materials on
Trade Regulation, 208-218 (1937).
60. Hence the Act, however distasteful at times to the owners of large-
scale capital, is consistent with the ideology that modern private enterprise
has adopted in the United States as a defense against unwanted governmental
regulation. Compare Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S.
211 (1899), with Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 (1908); and see
Beard, Individualism and Capitalismn, 1 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 145, 153-54, 161(1930).
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ness enterprise to the unitary control of single managements might
continue, provided "restraints" upon competitors or upon com-
petition in the markets where goods were sold were not imposed.6'
Thus was introduced a dichotomy into the conception of the struc-
ture and mechanics of a competitive order which has persisted to
the present day. 2
Closely allied to the traditional capitalist ideology as a factor
influencing the antitrust laws and their administration-although
less clearly relevant under the economic terms employed in the
statutes-is the belief in a society composed in large part of inde-
pendent, self-reliant individuals which has found frequent expres-
sion in the course of American history. Eloquently uttered by
Louis D. Brandeis both before his accession to the Supreme Court
and in judicial proceedings while he was on the bench,6 3 this belief
has recently been advanced as added cause for declining to sanction
the exericse of market controls by a large-scale corporate enterprise
and for compelling the surrender by such a corporation of some
of its assets, if not its total dissolution.64It has also been repeated
with renewed fervor by Mr. Justice Douglas in dissenting opinions.65
Justice Douglas advocates such methods of antitrust interpretation,
including acceptance by the courts when necessary of the duty of
making onerous economic determinations, as will contribute most
effectively to the maintenance of independent, small enterprises. 68
Belief in vigorous competition and small enterprise has been
accompanied, strikingly, by the desire for security and for orderly
progress through planning as a factor to be taken into account in
antitrust administration, as well as in other economic regulatory
measures.6 7 Woodrow Wilson, even while advocating free enter-
61. Cf. Handler, supra note 59.
62. See the recent Symposium on the Federal Antitrust Laws, 39 Am.
Econ. Rev. 689 (1949), especially the views of Arthur R. Burns at 691,
Frank Albert Fetter at 695, Ben W. Lewis at 703, 705, and Edward S.
Mason at 712.
63. See especially his dissenting opinion in Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288
U. S. 517 (1933), a case involving the constitutionality of state legislation
intended to have a restrictive effect upon chains of retail stores. In American
Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377 (1921), Brandeis's
preference for small enterprise over large led to his dissenting conclusion
that an association of small businesses should not be held to violate the
Sherman Act by cooperative activity in connection with the production and
sale of a commodity, lest the members be driven to merging the ownership
of their businesses. Id. at 418-419.
64. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 428, 429
(2d Cir. 1945).
65. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495, 534 (1948).
66. Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U. S. 293,
315 (1949).
67. Also, of course, in connection with the imposition of protective
import duties.
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prise, looked upon the controlled freedom of the locomotive, running
smoothly because of superb coordination of its parts, as the analogue
of freedom in society.68 During the post-1929 depression when the
winds of adversity blew strong, the philosophy of economic plan-
ning, mitigating the evils of competition when necessary, found
eloquent expression (once more in dissent) by the same Justice
Brandeis who believed in small enterprise-and, therefore, in its
preservation rather than its self-destruction."9 During this period,
the Supreme Court found room within the antitrust laws for the
lawful operation of a common selling agency for a group of coal
producers, despite the price uniformity and the probable sus-
taining effect upon prices which that operation would have.70
Earlier, a regulation of an organized commodity exchange which
resulted in price fixing for short periods of the day was upheld
as valid upon a theory, enunciated by Mr. Justice Brandeis, that
some economic restraints "merely regulate ... ," whereas others
suppress, competition, and that the distinction between the two
must be drawn in the light of relevant economic factors. 7 As re-
spects price-fixing or price-influencing arrangements, this view has
now been repudiated under the Sherman Act in favor of a more
hard-bitten philosophy ;72 but the decisions still stand and may
again be invoked in less prosperous times.
When the economy of the United States is viewed as a whole,
including both the parts that are subject to the antitrust laws and
those that have been excepted73 or have come under other forms
of regulation, it is clear that in fact, as regards privately-owned
business, an ever-changing adjustment has been struck between
competition protected from impairment on the one hand and sanc-
tioned restraints and regulations on the other hand. In addition,
considerable segments of governmentally owned and managed enter-
prise, such as the post office, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the
Atomic Energy Commission, federal lending agencies, the public
educational system, and local public utilities, have been maintained.
As a result of the adjustment that has been struck, labor and farm-
ers may combine to engage in forms of price fixing and collective
68. The New Freedom 281-284.
69. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U. S. 262 (1932).
70. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344 (1933).
71. Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U. S. 231, 238
(1918).
72. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150 (1940).
73. S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, Cases on Federal Anti-Trust Laws
63-69 (1948), contains a useful summary of statutory exclusions from these
laws. To these must now be added the Act of June 17, 1948, c. 491, 62 Stat.
472 (1948), 49 U. S. C. § 5b (1946).
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bargaining which are forbidden to others; while utility enter-
prises, both publicly and privately owned, are allowed proticted,
stable (although limited) earnings so far as consumers can be
made to provide them. Taxation is employed to provide through the
public treasury for personal, "social" security and for the earnings
of business enterprises, such as ocean shipping, which are deemed
to be in need of such provision.
The reasons for these disparities of treatment lie, of course, in
the social importance of the interests sought to be protected, as
these are legislatively, administratively, or judicially viewed. The
motivating considerations behind protective measures may relate
to human welfare, national defense or pride, or protection of
favored enterprises against loss. Whatever the specific considera-
tions may be, the losses or adversity that otherwise would fall upon
someone loom as greater than the state is willing to tolerate; and
measures are accordingly taken to prevent them if possible.
The philosophy of national responsibility for the general welfare
implicit in sovereignty and set forth originally in the provision of
the Constitution that Congress shall have power to levy taxes to
provide for the general welfare,7 4 has recently found explicit, al-
though equivocal, legislative expression in the Employment Act of
1946. That Act envisages coordinated legislative and administra-
tive measures, drawing upon all of the powers of the Federal Gov-
ernment, "for the purpose of creating and maintaining ... condi-
tions under which there will be afforded useful employment oppor-
tunities, including self-employment, for those able, willing, and
seeking to work, and to promote maximum employment, produc-
tion, and purchasing power."7 These necessary governmental
measures are to be taken, however, "in a manner calculated to
foster and promote free competitive enterprise ;" but the end pur-
pose is pretty clearly the general welfare, for which the rest is but
a means. Although Congress at times seems still unaware of its
own pronouncement, laissez faire has thus been deprived of its
status as the dominant economic and political philosophy of the
United States Government.
Like all other measures of national economic regulation, the
antitrust laws should be appraised and administered in the light
of this dominant national purpose; and it is believed that such has
in fact been the uniform intention, and usually the practice, of those
charged with responsibility for their enforcement. Just as the anti-
74. U. S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cd. 1.
75. 60 Stat. 23, § 2, 15 U. S. C. § 1021 (1946).
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trust laws have yielded to other legislative measures when neces-
sary, so discrimination has been exercised in their application, for
the purpose of promoting "maximum employment, production and
purchasing power." The "rule of reason," the various "per se"
doctrines that have supplemented it, and the additional acts of
legislation have been largely means to this end,T as the interests of
producers and consumers and of diverse groups in each category
have been balanced against each other.
In the administration of the antitrust laws, the responsible
tribunals have been compelled to deal frequently with three eco-
nomic factors that bear closely upon the dominant over-all purpose.
These are (1) the tendency of business enterprisers possessing
sufficient market control to curtail production and enhance prices
in order to maximize profits; (2) the influence of heavy capital
investment in intensifying the extremes and the hardship of price
competition; and (3) the tendency for the production and market-
ing of numerous commodities to become concentrated in the hands
of ever-larger (and usually fewer) aggregates of ownership.
In recent years the first of these three factors has received
definite theoretical attention. Whereas formerly "conspiracies" to
"victimize" the purchasers and consumers of products through un-
necessarily high prices were viewed as abnormal practices,77 it is
recognized today that the profit incentive operates normally to
cause business enterprisers to endeavor to create conditions under
which profits can be maximized and to take advantage of these
conditions when they exist. The recurring (but not universal)
76. An exception may be the Miller-Tydings amendment to section 1
of the Sherman Act, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1946), which
yielded the policy of that Act as judicially evolved, outlawing resale price
maintenance contracts between sellers and buyers, to the contrary policy
of subsequent state legislation validating such contracts as to trade-marked and
branded commodities. The pressures that resulted in the adoption of the
amendment came largely from associations of small retailers who sought
means of securing protection against the price competition of chain-store
merchants who handled the same goods. However speciously, they invoked
the philosophy of maintaining small enterprise and the principles of fair
dealing in support of their endeavor. These had early persuaded Louis D.
Brandeis to become the best-known proponent of the legalization of resale
price maintenance. Cf. Mason, Brandeis, A Free Man's Life 424-428 (1946).
For light on the campaign for resale price maintenance see 2 Marketing
Laws Survey, State Price Control Legislation 31-59 (U.S. Works Progress
Administration, 1940); Temporary National Economic Committee, Final
Report and Recommendations, Sen. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong., lqt sess., 142,
164, 232-237 .(1941).
77. The view that organized activities to reduce competition in the
sale of a product are unnatural and improper is most strongly expressed
in the opinion of the Court in American Column & Lumber Co. v. United
States, 257 U. S. 377 (1921).
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economic fact appears to be that greater profits result from a
smaller volume of business in a given product at prices which can
be realized from this volume than from a'larger volume, saleable
only at lower prices. The rate of profit may be higher from a lesser
volume of business even when total profits are not; and the pros-
pect of enhanced returns from a controlled volume of business may
be particularly attractive to the individual producers or producing
enterprises that lack incentive to expand.78 Under such conditions
the single enterprise will adjust its prices and volume of business
to a program of restriction if assurance can be obtained that com-
petitors will do likewise rather than capture business through
price cutting.7 Such assurance can arise in either of two ways:
(a) by agreement or (b) by mutual understanding among com-
petitors of the wisdom of a restrictive policy, coupled with knowl-
edge of each other's prices or production policies at all times. As
has been noted, agreement upon prices or price policies is ordi-
narily illegal; but circumstances under which a restrictive policy
may be followed without agreement are common and present a
legal problem which, as yet, has not been clearly answered.
In dealing with adherence to such a restrictive policy, which
78. Cf. Fly, Economic Theory and The Sugar Institute Decisions, 45
Yale L. J. 1339, 1343 (1936). The text in the opening pages of this article
contains a lucid treatment of the economic factor here under discussion.
79. Cf. Burns, The Decline of Competition 26, 27, 199 (1936); I
Lyon, Watkins, and Abramson, Government and Economic Life 277-279(1939); Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, c. 3 (5th
ed., 1946). No assertion that there is any economic "law" which dictates
such conduct, or any universal tendency to engage in it, is intended, of
course. Contrary condudt, as well as failure of price maintenance attempts,
has been observed and may be frequent. Cf., e.g., Stocking and Watkins,
Cartels or Competition? 261, n. 13 (1948) ; Wilcox, Competition and
Monopoly in American Industry, TNEC, Monograph No. 21, 48-51 (1940)
(the rubber industry in the United States prior to 1935). See also Mason,
Price and Production Policies of Large-Scale Enterprise, 29 Am. Econ. Rev.
Supp. 61 (1939). Notice must also be taken of the difficulties created by
concealed price cuts, accompanying purported adherence to quoted prices,
which many price-maintenance schemes have failed to overcome. See Sugar
Institute v. United States, 297 U. S. 553 (1936). Professor Mason has
recently again called attention to the concept of "effective competition,"
whereby the demands of antitrust policy are met if, under all the circum-
stances prevailing in an industry and despite limited power over prices by
sellers or buyers, there is "a fairly large number of sellers and buyers, no
one of whom occupies a large share of the market, [an] absence of collu-
sion among either group, and [a] possibility of market entry by new firms"
Mason, Current Status of the Monopoly Problem, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1265, 1268(1949). Granted that, under modern conditions, nothing more is possible or
desirable than administration of the antitrust laws in such a way as to
promote and preserve competition in this sense, it is still worth while to
examine the logic of "imperfect" competition and identify those aspects of
it that are likely to give trouble and to call for remedial action if not offset
by other factors.
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is known as "imperfect" competition,80 the courts and the Federal
Trade Commission may now draw upon economic reasoning which
was not articulated until a few years ago. According to this reason-
ing, competitors who have continuous knowledge of each other's
prices, or production policies bearing upon prices, know that any
effort by one to obtain a competitive advantage through lower
prices, or through expansion that can only lead to lower prices, .will
be met promptly by the others,8 1 with consequent loss of the benefit
that had been sought. The result will be lower prices to all with
consequent enlargement of volume but, unless market conditions
require such a readjustment, lower profits than a price-maintenance
policy would have brought. Hence frequently, in the situations
where price-maintenance increases profits, or even where it is
merely thought to- do so, a restrictive policy results naturally from
the availability of information as -to actual prices or production
policies . 2 This result is particularly probable in capital goods and
raw materials industries, where demand is usually inelastic in
relation to price and price reductions may not even add materially
to volume of business.8 3 -It is dependent, however, upon the exist-
ence of obstacles to the advent of new competition, such as spring
from the need for heavy capital investment to commence mass pro-
duction or from patent, copyright, or trade-mark monopolies in the
hands of existing producers.8 4 Such barriers to the intrusion of un-
wanted competition are sufficiently usual to afford protection to
existing enterprises in many situations.
80. Wilcox, mipra note 79, at 3, 4.
81. The response of competitors may be delayed, of course, or avoided
altogether, by factors such as trade-marks, uniqueness of style, etc., sub-
sumed under the term "product differentiation," which enable price differ-
entials to exist. Chamberlin, op. cit. mspra note 79, c. 4; Brown, Advertising
and the Pulic Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 Yale L. J.
1165, 1170-1175 (1948).
82. Considerable attention has been given recently to evidence that
concerns having power over prices may exercise it under some circum-
stances to hold their charges below the highest feasible levels on products
they sell, as many have done during the post-war boom period. They are
doubtless moved to this course by possible adverse effects on labor and
government attitudes and on consumer good will, which might result from
charging all that the traffic would bear. Cf. Lewis, supra note 62; Adelman,
Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1289, 1290
(1948).
83. Burns, op. cit. supra note 79, at 26, 27. Cf., however, Stocking &
Watkins, supra note 79, at 247-248, pointing out that demand for raw mate-
rials as a whole may be quite elastic, even though the demand for a single
product, taken by itself, is inelastic.
84. Stocking and Watkins, supra note 79, at 11, 12; Hamilton, Patentts
and Free Enterprise, T. N. E. C. Monograph No. 31, 76-86 (1941) ; United
States v. U. S. Gypsum Co.. 333 U. S. 364 (1948) ; United States v. Timken
Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (1949).
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The recurring pattern in many areas of business that have
attracted enforcement efforts under the antitrust laws is one of
real or suspected price maintenance under the conditions just out-
lined. Knowledge among competitors of each other's prices or
policies affecting prices comes about either because the competitors
are extremely few in number or because, where the number is
somewhat larger but not too large for practical communication,
information is exchanged among them usually through trade asso-
ciations. Where the competitors are few, "price leadership"8 5 or
tacit understanding8 6 readily arises; where the number is greater,
a variety of reporting schemes has been devised to enable each to
proceed with relative security in regard to the others. 7
It is relevant to note here again that, according to certain legal
doctrines reviewed above,"" which have been enunciated rather
recently under the Sherman Act, the intentional acquisition or
maintenance of power to control prices is illegal. By power to con-
trol is not meant absolute power free of limits, but power within
limits to exercise choices 5 such as cannot be made by one who
deals in a fully competitive market.90 If these doctrines are
logically and rigorously applied, the small number of firms domi-
nating an industry who watch each other and follow calculated,
restrained price policies, and the larger number who establish
means of watching each other and follow similar policies, violate
the law unless, in the case of the smaller number, their position
85. Bums, op. cit. supra, c. 3; United States v. United States Steel
Corp., 251 U. S. 417 (1920) ; United States v. International Harvester Co.,
274 U. S. 693 (1927).
86. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781 (1946).
This case involves mutual adherence to advantageous price policies by a few
large buyers, as well as sellers. All that is said with reference to price
practices on the part of sellers is applicable also to buyers in the rarer
situations where the advantage in economic power rests with them-with
the modification, of course, that their effort will be directed toward holding
prices down rather than toward sustaining them.
87. That such is the purpose of numerous trade association plans,
which have embodied a succession of devices for enabling members to keep
track of what was going on, taking cognizance of legal hazards revealed
by Supreme Court decisions, is clearly evident from the account given in
Pearce, Trade Association Survey, T. N. E. C. Monograph No. 18, 46-56, 352
(1940).
88. See text to notes 28, 29 supra.
89. The opinion in the Aluminum Co. case, holding the Company's
power to be illegal, recognizes clearly the limits to that power imposed by
the possibility of imports and by the competition of other products, to say
nothing of potential competition within the industry even in the face of the
advantages which the Company enjoyed.
90. The classic example of such a market is, of course, the commodity
exchange; but any line of business in which prices are determined separately
in each transaction, without knowledge among buyers or sellers of each
other's identities, is likely to belong in the same category.
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is achieved without design through the failure of competitors or,
perhaps, through lawful use of one or more patents or other law-
ful bases for monopoly power. No decision has as yet actually
rested alone upon this logic, however.91 Only in the Aluminum
Company case92 has the logic been set forth with complete clarity;
and even there abuse of power through squeezing of competitors
was also present in the facts. In all other cases involving the prob-
lem, in which decisions adverse to defendants were reached, similar
"predatory practices" were prominent or a concerted effort to limit
or apportion production or control prices was clearly evident.
Hence it is still to be seen whether the existence of non-collusive
power over prices may alone lead to decisions holding such power
to be illegal, 93 or whether it will remain, as heretofore, simply an
aid to the recognition of situations where oppression of competi-
tors or collusive effort to control prices is manifested.9'
In so far as the decisions display a tendency to tolerate control
over prices by business enterprisers, with benefit to themselves,
the reason lies less in a desire to permit large profits to be achieved
by this means than in recognition of a need for preventing the evils
91. An exception should perhaps be made of certain cases in which
combinations of the ownership of partially competing railroad lines were
held illegal, especially Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S.
197 (1904) ; United States.v. Union Pacific Co., 226 U. S. 61 (1912) ; and
United States v. Southern Pacific Co., 259 U. S. 214 (1922). It is probable,
however, that the decisions in these cases were influenced by the general
bad odor into which the railroad industry had fallen because of past bad
practices and the financial manipulation which attended personal and cor-
porate struggles for "empire." United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U. S.
218 (1947), looks in the same direction as the railroad cases; but the
Government's effort to secure dissolution failed. 80 F. Supp. 936 (N.D. Ill.,
1948), aff'd, 338 U. S. 338 (1949).
92. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945).
93. As stated in the opinion of the court, Tag Manufacturers' Institute
v. Federal Trade Commission, 174 F. 2d 452 (1st Cir., 1949) appears to
present this question. The decision sustains the Institute's arrangements, in
the absence of proof that the power was used to sustain prices. In the
Sugar Institute case also, advance announcement of prices, understood to
be effective until further notice, but without obligation to adhere to them,
was accepted as valid because of historical factors within the industry.
Publication of current prices, theoretically subject to change without notice,
is common, of course.
94. Arguably, the decisions in American Column & Lumber Co. v.
United States, 257 U. S. 377 (1921), and Maple Flooring Ass'n v. United
States, 268 U. S. 563 (1925), which frequently are regarded as essentially in
conflict, may be reconciled on this ground. In the former, actual prices of
the members of the hardwood association were distributed quite promptly
among the membership. Without agreement to follow a common policy, the
members were nevertheless enabled to do so. In the later case, a single
average cost figure was communicated, giving no assurance as to the
members' price policies in the absence of an obligation, which was not shown,
to use the figure as a basis for calculating prices.
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of "cut-throat" competition. These evils include not only the hu-
man consequences of business failure, analogous in some degree to
the effects of sub-standard wages and depressed agricultural prices,
but also the intensified business hardship of competitive price re-
ductions in industries characterized by heavy capital investment-
the second of the economic factors mentioned above as frequently
important in the administration of the antitrust laws. The quest
for security, so prevalent among all participants in economic ac-
tivity, becomes particularly urgent under these circumstances. The
failure to achieve control over prices may lead, in times of inade-
quate demand, to competitive price reductions which carry income
far below cost of production. So long as some margin above vari-
able costs is realized and can be applied to interest upon indebted-
ness and other fixed costs, the business receiving the margin is
better off than it would be if it ceased operating. Moreover cost
per unit of product falls rapidly as volume of production rises,
under conditions of heavy capital investment. Hence the effort to
secure volume of business at the expense of competitors and to
continue to receive some income in excess of out-of-pocket costs
may well lead to price reductions that will prove disastrous to
solvency when reserve funds have been exhaused. It is likely,
moreover, that the facilities of businesses which fail under these
circumstances will not be withdrawn from production. Being fre-
quently more advantageously saleable for use as entities than for
dismantling, these facilities may pass into the hands of new owners
who, freed of a large part of previous capital charges, may offer
lethal price competition to remaining solvent enterprises. 95 Con-
sumers may benefit from low prices under these conditions; but ex-
penditures for the preservation of physical properties may be
omitted and, in the extractive industries, conservation of natural
resources may suffer.' In any event, investment of additional funds
in an industry that falls into these circumstances is likely to be dis-
couraged. 7
95. Burns, supra note 79, at 29-34; Hamilton and Till, Anti-trust in
Action, T. N. E. C. Monograph No. 16, 19-20 (1940); Clark, Studies in the
Economics of Overhead Costs, c. 21 (1923).
96. The Annual Report of the United States Secretary of Agriculture
for 1947 brings out strikingly the relationship between adequate farm in-
comes and adherence to soil-conserving measures. Enormous waste in the
lumber and coal industries is proverbial. As to petroleum see Rostow, A
National Policy for the Oil Industry (1948) and works cited, some of
which adopt conflicting views.
97. In the bituminous coal industry of the United States the opening
of new mines has been deterred less than the spread of coal-conserving prac-




It is arguable, of course, that concerted measures to cope with
such conditions, regardless of their merit, are forbidden by the
antitrust laws and can only be undertaken if legislatively author-
ized, 98 as concerted action by farmers has been authorized. Further,
it can be argued that it is not wise to authorize such private con-
trols and that, if controls are needed, they should be set up under
public authority, as has been done in the regulation of public
utilities. 99 Statutes establishing public controls are difficult to
secure, however, and are subject to weaknesses of their own. Until
the pressures generated by a depression or in some particularly
hard-hit industry 00 have again come before the courts, it is not
possible to say that the difficulty of preserving efficiency and
solvency for large-scale enterprise in a fluctuating economy, unless
some form of control over prices is maintained, has no claim to
recognition in the administration of the antitrust laws.
The third economic factor listed above, the tendency toward
larger and fewer aggregates of ownership in modem business, bad
a strong influence for more than thirty years after the adoption of
the Sherman Act in favor of relaxation of the statute as, against
large corporations.' 0 ' Recently it has again been accepted by a
majority of the Supreme Court as a consideration favorable to the
legality of a corporate acquisition which bad been challenged. 0 2
The extent of the tendency has been pointed out strikingly in the
literature. 0 3 Justification for it is offered on the basis of a variety
of alleged benefits, including especially (a) increased technological
efficiency through larger units of manufacture, combining both
successive stages in production and greater volume of production
98. The most essential and pervasive features of the scheme established
by the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 were of this type and
were so authorized; but official supervision of industry programs was con-
templated. See II Lyon, Watldns, and Abramson, Government and Economic
Life, c. 27 (1940).
99. The bituminous coal industry in the United States was subjected
for a period before World War II to public control which, however, was
experimental and did not achieve a stable pattern before its demise in 1941.
Id. c. 24. Cf. the exchange of views between Professors Rostow and Hamil-
ton in 50 Yale L. J. at 543-620 (1941).
100. See National Ass'n of Window Glass Manufacturers v. United
States, 263 U. S. 403 (1923).
101. Especially in United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S.
417 (1920).
102. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495 (1948).
103. The facts are assembled in Wilcox, supra note 79, c. 1; Smaller
War Plants Corporation, Economic Concentration and World War II, Sen.
Doc. No. 206, Part 1. 79th Cong., 2d sess. Cf. also Levi, The Antitrust
Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. Chi. L. Rev. 153 (1947). For a critical discus-
sion see Adelman, supra note 82, at 1292-1295.
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at the same stage,104 and (b) increased economic efficiency made
possible by assured outlets and sources of supply for products,
where concerns which use certain articles or materials are brought
under the same ownership as those that make them. 0 5 The validity
of these contentions, as applied to combinations sufficiently large
in scale to raise questions under the antitrust laws, has not been
either established or disproven. 1°6 In the nature of things it probably
cannot be, except in particular situations to which attention is
directed. There can scarcely be doubt, however, as to the economic
power over prices which results when a few aggregates of owner-
ship enjoy the entire trade in a given commodity, or as to the
monopolization of a market or source of supply which occurs in
fact when ownership of a customer or supplier is acquired. The most
critical test of the present vitality of the antitrust laws will come
when, without the mitigating factor of actual or threatened eco-
nomic hardship and in the absence of abuse of the economic power
enjoyed, a large aggregate of capital controlling a considerable
segment of an industry'07 is again compelled to rely in an antitrust
proceeding upon the alleged benefits of bigness as justification for
its size.
Undoubtedly business combinations, whether aggregates of
ownership or organizations of otherwise separate units, are able
to engage in economic planning such as cannot occur in a fully
competitive system. The question naturally arises, therefore,
whether the philosophy of the antitrust laws, which would place
104. The two forms of integration are known, respectively, as "ver-
tical" and "horizontal." Both exist to a degree in all production, as con-
trasted with the minutest possible division of labor. Integration which goes
beyond the conventional, or which involves uniting physically separate
establishments under one ownership, gives rise to questions of public policy.
105. The Yellow Cab Co. and Columbia Steel Co. cases involve com-
binations partially of this variety, as do the American Telephone & Tele-
graph Company's ownership of the Western Electric Co., the chain grocery
stores' ownership of food processing concerns, and the community of owner-
ship of a variety of concerns maintained by the duPont interests, which are
currently being challenged. A still different variety of integration occurs
when concerns dealing in products that have no physical relation to each
other are brought under one ownership, as has happened notably in the
food and drug manufacturing and processing fields. Cf. United States Federal
Trade Com'n, Report on the Present Trend of Corporate Mergers and
Acquisitions (1947).
106. Adelman, supra note 82, at 1291, 1292. Cf. Blair, Technology and
Size, 38 Am. Econ. Rev. Supp. 121 (1948), and the eomments of Stewart
at 166; Federal Trade Commission, Relative Efficiency of Large, Medium
Sized, and Small Business, T. N. E. C. Monograph No. 13 (1940).
107. The Columbia Steel Co. case, while presenting this question in a
sense, actually involved only a relatively minor absorption of a regional
concern by the United States Steel Corporation, coming after a more im-
portant acquisition which had received government sanction. The power of
the Corporation as a whole was not challenged.
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strict limits upon the opportunity for such planning, is opposed
to economic planning in general. The answer is that it is not,
unless the antitrust philosophy condemns not only business com-
binations but also all forms of control. Historically and to some
extent in administration, as has been noted, the antitrust laws con-
stitute a positive program for maintaining a competitive system, as
well as a prohibition of specific evils. The assertion is frequently
made today that success of the antitrust program is essential to
democracy and to the avoidance of public regulation or socialization,
which are asserted or assumed to be undesirable.108 Yet the laws
as formulated are--directed only against aggregates of power in
the hands of business enterprisers, and they contain no commitment
to private enterprise as against public ownership or in favor of
competition as against possible legislative provision for some
publicly regulated scheme of economic organization. In the setting
of contemporary thought and tendencies, particularly as they
emerge in the Employment Act of 1946, the antitrust laws should
be viewed as neutral in relation to other types of planning or con-
trol which, in time, may supersede them at least in part."0 9 The
solution of the economic problems of the future is likely to require
resort to all of the organizational devices evolved by men which
are consistent with the fundamental values of western culture,
rather than doctrinnaire adherence to only a single one.
108. Arnold, Democracy and Free Enterprise 44-62 (1942); Berge,
Cartels: Challenge to a Free World 234-235 (1944).
109. Cf. Edwards, An Appraisal of the Antitrust Laws, 36 Am. Econ.
Rev. Supp. 172 (1946).
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